Teaching or Treason? The Fed, Beijing, and a Spy Story Hiding in Plain Sight
A former Fed economist is accused of secretly funneling sensitive insights to China — and the timeline spans nearly a decade.
May 26, 2025
A Decade-Long Game of Economic Espionage?
What happens when one of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s own is accused of spying for China?
That’s the question now facing John Rogers — a longtime Fed economist arrested this year on charges of economic espionage. At the center of the case: a trail of email invitations, hotel meetings, “teaching” contracts, and $50,000 in hidden cash, allegedly tied to Chinese intelligence efforts.
According to federal prosecutors, Rogers’ work at the Fed wasn’t just academic. U.S. authorities allege he was quietly relaying sensitive internal Fed materials to Chinese handlers posing as students, beginning with an all-expenses-paid trip to Shanghai in 2013. From there, the relationship evolved — and prosecutors say it was anything but innocent.
“That visit... marked the beginning of a yearslong effort by Chinese intelligence to extract sensitive information,” the DOJ alleges.
China’s Soft Infiltration Strategy: More Than Just Defense Secrets
This case isn’t about stolen missile plans or hacked servers. It’s about a different kind of espionage — one that targets economic policy, interest rate strategy, and the people who shape global finance behind closed doors.
A 2022 Senate report revealed that Beijing has spent the past decade cultivating deep academic ties with U.S. economic institutions, including the Federal Reserve. Allegations include:
Coordinated campaigns to gain insight into Fed operations and policy deliberations.
Threats and detainment of U.S. officials in China who didn’t comply.
Persistent outreach from Chinese-affiliated “students” and researchers, even years after contact.
Rogers, who joined the Fed in 1994 and left in 2021, appeared to fit the profile: respected, well-credentialed, and not directly involved in high-level FOMC decisions — making him a lower-risk target for exploitation.
The Line Between Teaching and Leaking
Rogers insists he only taught and never conspired — but the paper trail tells a more complicated story:
2017: Accepts another China trip via the same “graduate student” who originally reached out.
2018: Texts handler, “There has to be a lot more done to make this legitimate in the eyes of the Fed... I’m only allowed to teach.”
2020: Loses access to Fed systems; later forced out of the institution.
2021–2022: Still receiving paid teaching offers and all-expenses-paid invitations from Chinese contacts.
By the time he left, he had signed a $150,000 teaching deal and received a $300,000 research grant from a Chinese government-linked institution. Prosecutors also claim he continued supplying materials as a visiting professor.
Implications for U.S. Institutions
This isn’t just a one-off headline. It highlights:
The real vulnerabilities in soft-power channels like academic forums, think tanks, and consulting roles.
How economic intelligence — not just military secrets — is becoming a priority target.
The blurred lines between global research and geopolitical risk, especially in macroeconomics and central banking.
Fed Chair Jerome Powell has since tightened internal rules around foreign travel and gifts, but this case raises a more fundamental question:
If one of the most guarded institutions in global finance can be infiltrated this quietly — what else is happening under the surface?